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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
JOHN F. HAWKINS,
Plaintif{-Respondent,

vs.

HELEN H. ALLEN,

Case No.

10265

Defendant-Appellant,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
John F. Hawkins, the respondent, seeks the affirmance
of the judgment of the District Court and costs on appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The collision in this case occurred as the Hawkins vehicle, having made a left turn, was coming out of the turn
and started into an easterly course at the intersection of
First South and Tremonton Street in Tremonton, Utah (Tr.
2). Prior to making the turn, Hawkins (hereinafter called
plaintiff) placed on his left turn signal for a distance of
approximately 100 feet, approached the intersection from
the inside lane of traffic, and turned into the lane of traffic
next to the center line proceeding east (Tr. 3, 4). Before

entering the intersection, plaintiff noted the vehicle driven
by Mrs. Allen, (hereinafter called defendant) an 86 year
old woman, parked by a mail drop directly parallel to the
curb and facing North. As the plaintiff's vehicle entered
the intersection plaintiff and an occupant in plaintiff's vehicle, one Miss Gent, became aware of the car driven by
Mrs. Allen which at that time, having proceeded directly
parallel to the curb at a distance of no more than 2 feet,
(Tr. 5, 6) pulled into the intersection from an untraveled
portion of the roadway giving no indication of an intent to
turn (Tr. 6). In order to avoid the collision Mr. Hawkins
accelerated but his automobile was nonetheless struck in
the right rear and damaged in the amount of $181.93. The
damages were stipulated at trial. Hawkins speculated that
his speed at the time of collision was, " ... about 12 miles
an hour" (Tr. 4). Further, under cross examination, Mr.
Hawkins conjectured that defendant's speed was approximately the same (Tr. 9).
After the collision occurred, Mrs. Allen crossed the
center line of the roadway, continued in motion down the
wrong side of the road and did not stop until such time as
Mr. Hawkins indicated that it was improper to leave the
scene of an accident (Tr. 7). The testimony of Miss Gent
indicated clearly that Mrs. Allen was never aware of ilhe
presence of the car driven by Hawkins (Tr. 8). Counsel
for Mrs. Allen conceded the negligence of his client at the
hearing on the motion for a new trial. The testimony
of Miss Gent and Mrs. Allen has not been designated as a
part of the record on this appeal.

POINT I.
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS
DISCRETION.
Defendant relies for his contention that plaintiff was
contributorily negligent as a matter of law in not yielding
the right of way to the defendant upon Sec. 41-6-73 U. C.
A. 1953 (as amended). The statute provides as follows:

Vehicle turning left at intersection-the driver
of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn
to the left shall yield the right of way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which
is within the intersection or so close thereto as to
constitute an immediate hazard, during the time
when such driver is moving within the intersection.
In determining whether or not plaintiff was at fault
under the statute, or in determining if the statute itself
were applicable, the trial judge was, because sitting without a jury, empowered to decide several issues of fact. The
trial judge needed to decide whether the Allen vehicle
which was proceeding in the opposite direction from Mr.
Hawkins, who was then turning left, was in the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard.
Mr. Hawkins' testimony to the effect that he was first
into the intersection was uncontested at the trial (Tr. 1718). Being the only evidence before the court on that question, it would appear that there was clearly substantial
evidence to justify the factual determination of the trial
judge in favor of the plaintiff, Hawkins.
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The testimony of Mr. Hawkins that Mrs. Allen was
parked parallel to the mailbox on an untraveled portion of
the roadway at the time Hawkins entered the intersection
was sufficient basis upon which the judge could make a
finding as to a matter peculiarly within his judicial discretion. That the judge did so decide is indicated by his statement,

"However, there is nothing shown by the defendant in this case that, at the time the plaintiff
commenced the left turn, the defendant's car was
approaching the intersection. In fact the evidence
indicates the car was parked at the curb. Also, the
evidence shows that the defendant's car never did
enter the intersection from the traveled portion of
the roadway, but pulled into the intersection directly from the parking area at the curb, traveling
a distance of some 15 to 18 feet before striking the
rear of plaintiff's car, after the plaintiff had completed the left turn and was proceeding in an easterly direction from the intersection." (Emphasis
added.)
(Trial Judge's Decision on Motion for New Trial,
R. 26.)
A presumption arises upon appeal that the court's decision on a discretionary matter has been made in proper
exercise of such discretion when the contrary does not appear from the record. Hanberry v. Fitzgerald, 72 N. M.
383, 384 P. 2d 256, Anderson v. Johnson, 1 Ut. 2d 400, 268
P. 2d 427, Book v. Book, 99 Wyo. 433, 141 P. 2d 546. An
appellant claiming abuse of discretion has the burden of
proving that contention. Knapp v. Life Insurance Corporation of America, 8 Ut. 2d 220, 332 P. 2d 662. Matters
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falling with the area of judicial discretion will not be lightly
upset and discretionary determinations are better considered as reviewable only in case of "gross", "clear'', "plain",
"palpable", or "manifest" abuses of discretion. Redwine v.
Fitzhugh, 78 Wyo. 407, 329 P. 2d 257, 72 A. L. R. 2d 644.
See also; 5 Am. Jur. 2d "Appeal and Error" Section 744,
page 217.
The effect of the ruling of the trial court was to acknowledge the defendant's failure to meet her burden of
proof on the issue of contributory negligence. As to the
mental processes of the judge on this point there can be
little question in light of the following:
"There is no evidence shown by the defendant
as to the width of the street, or the distance the
plaintiff must have traveled in order to get through
the intersection. Since the defendant must affirmatively show this by competent evidence, and it has
not been so shown, the motion is denied."
(Judge's Decision on Motion for New Trial, R. 27.)
Appellant has attempted to establish at trial, upon motion for new trial, and now upon appeal, a mathematical
basis for the contention that the plaintiff, Hawkins, was
negligent as a matter of law. The computations begin upon
the faulty premise that a given speed said to be from 10
to 12 miles per hour was established at trial for both vehicles. Mr. Hawkins, in fact, "imagined" (Tr. 12) the
speed of his own vehicle and was, of course, only able to
conjecture as to the speed of Mrs. Allen's. The Trial Judge,
however, leaves little doubt as to his thinking on the matter and reasoned as follows :

"The defendant further urges that because the
plaintiff traveled twice as far as the defendant in
the same length of time, the plaintiff must have
known, or should reasonably have known, the defendant was approaching the intersection before the
plaintiff commenced making his left turn. This is
not so, since the distance traveled by the defendant
was very short. Even counting the distance traveled in the parking area, the total distance the defendant traveled would be from 60 to 75 feet ...
Thus the plaintiff could very well have commenced
his left turn 120 to 150 feet before impact."
Plaintiff has no argument with the authorities cited
by the defendant or with the principles of law governing
left turns therein enunciated. It should be noted, however,
that in both Cederlof f v. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 169 P. 2d
777 and French v. Utah Oil Company, 117 Utah 406, 260
P. 2d 1002, the party turning left turned in the face of an
oncoming vehicle. Such precedents are scarcely appropriate where, as here, the evidence preponderates against the
notion that when sighted by Hawkins the Allen vehicle was
moving. The judge's conclusion that, " . . . the evidence
indicates the car was parked at the curb," clearly establishes that this matter presents a different factual situation than the cases cited in defendant's brief.
Defendant contends that the lower court's findings of
fact erroneously assumed that the collision did not occur
within the intersection because the judge is supposed to
have felt that the intersection was bounded by the edge
of the roadway and not by the curb line. It is suggested
that this assumption failed to take note of the statutory
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definition of an intersection. A careful reading of the Trial
Judge's Decision on the Motion for New Trial (R. 26)
clearly indicates that no such faulty assumption was made.
The judge merely points out that,
". . . the evidence shows that the defendant's
car never did enter the intersection from the traveled portion of the roadway, but pulled into the intersection directly from the parking area at the
curb, traveling a distance of some 15 to 18 feet before striking the rear of plaintiff's car, after the
plaintiff had completed the left turn and was proceeding in an easterly direction from the intersection."
The trial judge reasoned that a vehicle parked upon an
untraveled portion of the roadway was not a vehicle "approaching" from the opposite direction within the purview
of the statute.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT IN ERROR IN FAILING TO FIND THAT PLAINTIFF
WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW FOR FAILURE TO KEEP
A PROPER LOOKOUT.
Defendant had the burden of proving contributory
negligence at trial. Plaintiff was required only to do what
a reasonable and prudent person would have done under
the circumstances. Berger v. Salt Lake City, 56 Ut. 403,
191 P. 233. In order for this court to concur with defendant's contention that respondent was contributorily negligent as a matter of law for failure to maintain a proper

lookout it must be found that as to that point reasonable
men could not differ on the question of plaintiff's negligence.
The testimony at trial was to the effect that the plaintiff, Hawkins, upon approaching the intersection and upon
entry into same was aware of only one vehicle in any direction, that vehicle being the car driven by Mrs. Allen which
was then parked parallel to a mail drop on an untraveled
portion of the roadway. Mr. Hawkins further indicated that
in making the turn his attention was momentarily diverted
in avoiding certain holes in the roadway (Tr. 4). It is
clearly arguable that such conduct was under all the
circumstances that of a reasonable man of ordinary
prudence. The decision at trial in plaintiff's behalf was
an indication that the judge below, operating as the decider of fact, chose so to believe. Unless this court can
say that upon this issue reasonable men could not
differ, his decision should be affirmed. Findings of the
trial judge are ordinarily not disturbed on appeal if they
are supported by the evidence or at least by substantial
evidence, even though there may also have been other conflicting evidence pending against the trial judge's conclusions. 5 Am. Jur. 2d "Appeal and Error" section 839, page
282.
POINT III.
THE FINDINGS
SIONS OF LAW
WERE CORRECT
FORM OF SUCH

OF FACT AND CONCLUOF THE LOWER COURT
AND IN ANY EVENT THE
FINDINGS DID NOT CON-
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STITUTE PREJUDICIAL ERROR ENTITLING
DEFENDANT TO THE RELIEF PRAYED
FOR.
Defendant contends that the lower court was in error
in failing to find that plaintiff's negligence proximately
caused the collision. Counsel for Mrs. Allen conceded at
the hearing upon the Motion for a New Trial, the negligence of defendant, concluding that the only issue for discussion at that time concerned the possible contributory
negligence of Mr. Hawkins. In light of that admission the
decision on the Motion for a New Trial of the trial judge
was confined to precisely the issue of plaintiff's possible
contributory negligence (R. 26).
It is difficult to understand in what manner defendant

has been damaged by the Findings below. If, as defendant
indicates, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are to
aid the appellate court, affording it a clear understanding
as to the basis of the lower court's decision, it becomes apparent that the court can in this instance readily proceed
with sufficient facts to understand the decision below.
The Findings explicitly indicate, "That as a result of
the defendant's negligence, plaintiff's automobile was damaged in the amount of $181.93" (R. 22). The purport of
the above statement is to indicate that plaintiff's damages
resulted or were caused by defendant's negligence. The
better view followed by most courts is that if the judgment
or decree is not affected at all or is not affected in a way
which is prejudicial to the party complaining, a defect or

error in the supporting verdict or findings may be disregarded by the- reviewing court. Boeing Airplane Co. v.
Firemens Fund Indem. Co., 44 Wash. 2d 488, 268 P. 2d
654, 45 A. L. R. 2d 984. See also: 5 Am. Jur. 2d "Appeal
and Error", section 819, page 260. Assuming, as the defendant contends, that the finding is inappropriate and the
trial court is in error, it does not appear that any substantial right of the defendant was prejudicially affected by
such defect or error entitling defendant to a reversal. This
court has taken the position that in the case of erroneous
findings of fact, the appellate court will not reverse the
judgment if the findings that should have been made will
support the judgment. Tree v. White, 110 Utah 233, 171
P. 2d 398.
The better view is that failure to specifically mention
proximate cause in the findings of fact is a mere matter
of form having little if any validity on appeal. Such failure
provides no insuperable obstacle to this court's ability to
interpret, understand and comprehend the rationale of the
decision below. As a general rule no appeal lies upon the
court's findings of facts. Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 93
Utah 426, 73 P. 2d 1277, 114 A. L. R. 726.
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CONCLUSION
The trial judge's decision should be affirmed and respondent should be awarded costs.
JOEL M. ALLRED,

Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent.

15 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah

RAYMOND M. BERRY,

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant.

1473 South 11th East
Salt Lake City, Utah

